Securing the multicast communication model is a strategic requirement for effective deployment of large scale business multi-party applications (TV over Internet, Video-on-Demand (VoD), video-conferencing, interactive group games, .). One of the main issues in securing multicast communication is the authentication service; a keystone of every secure architecture. Even though several authentication mechanisms have existed so far, data origin authentication in multi-party communications remains a challenging problem in terms of scalability, efficiency and performance.
The lack of security obstructs the large scale deployment of multicast [10] communication applications, such as: TV over Internet, Video-on-Demand (VoD), video-conferencing, e-learning, database replication and interactive group games. One of the main issues in securing multicast communication is the authentication service; a keystone of every secure architecture. Even though several authentication mechanisms have existed so far, data origin authentication in multi-party communications remains a challenging problem in terms of scalability, efficiency and performance. Indeed, hashes [12, 22, 40] , MACs [23] , and digital signatures [37, 41] are the cryptographic answers to integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation in data transmission. However, these mechanisms have been designed typically for point-to-point transmissions, and using them in multicasting yields inefficient and nonadequate solutions. This non-suitability of existing authentication mechanisms is mainly due to the number of group members which may be high in multi-party applications, and to the type of transmitted data which consists generally in continuous streaming of multicast messages with realtime transmission requirement.
In order to assure that a message originates from a valid group member, generally group members use a shared key. This key is commonly called, group key. Indeed, applying a MAC to a message with the group key assures that the message originates from a valid group member, since only valid group members are supposed to know the group key. Hence, the group authentication problem is reduced to the group key management and essentially to its scalability to large groups [8, 19, 20, 38] . In contrast, data origin Computer Communications xx (xxxx) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] www.elsevier.com/locate/comcom
authentication in multicasting is more complicated because the group key which is known by all group members cannot be used to identify a specific sender. Furthermore, to guarantee non-repudiation of the multicast data origin, the stream has to be signed. In order to avoid signing each packet of the multicast data stream, proposed solutions rely on the concept of amortizing a single digital signature over multiple packets. The signature and its amortization induces some extra-information called the authentication information. Besides, most of multicast media streaming applications do not use reliable transport layer. Hence, some packets may be lost in course of transmission. Therefore, the proposed solutions introduce redundancy in the authentication information, in a way that even if some packets are lost, the required authentication information can be recovered in order to verify received packets' authenticity. In this case, the bandwidth overhead, induced by the redundant authentication information, increases. Proposed solutions deal with how to trade bandwidth for tolerance to packet loss. One problem with existing solutions is that they do not take into consideration the distribution of packet loss throughout a large scale network [49] . Indeed, in existing solutions, the source considers the worst packet loss ratio that receivers may encounter in the network and introduces the required authentication information redundancy degree to tolerate this worst case. This approach assures a high tolerance to packet loss but introduces extra authentication information overhead since it considers the worst case which is likely to appear only at some parts of the network.
In this paper, we propose an efficient multicast data origin authentication protocol based on a novel layered hash-chaining scheme. We called this protocol: Receiver driven Layered Hash-chaining for multicast data origin authentication (RLH). This protocol tolerates packet loss and guarantees non-repudiation of media-streaming origin. Furthermore, RLH allows receivers to make the decision regarding the authentication information redundancy degree depending on the quality of reception in term of packet loss ratio. This novel technique allows to save bandwidth since the packet loss distribution over a large scale network is likely to be not uniform [49] . We have simulated our protocol using NS-2, and the simulation results show that the protocol has remarkable features and efficiency compared to other recent data origin authentication protocols.
In the following section, we give an overview of existing data origin authentication protocols for group communication, then we present some related works that use hashchaining techniques to amortize signatures over a sequence of packets of a data-stream. In Section 4, we describe our protocol: RLH, then we evaluate and compare it with other protocols using NS-2 simulations. Fig. 1 illustrates a classification of existing solutions for data origin authentication in group communication. In a first stage we classify them according to the security goal. Namely, we distinguish two sets of protocols: the protocols that aim to assure data origin authentication, and the protocols that aim to assure non-repudiation of the data origin. Then, we refine the classification depending on the technical concept underlying each subset of those protocols.
Data origin authentication in group communication
In what follows, we present briefly each category of the protocols depicted in Fig. 1 . 1 In Section 3, we present with some details the protocols that fit into the same category of RLH protocol in order to ease its presentation in the subsequent sections.
Multicast data origin authentication
This security level guarantees only data origin authentication of the multicast source. In this case, a sender needs to Fig. 1 . Taxonomy of data origin authentication protocols in group communication. 1 Detailed descriptions of the protocols as well as comparisons and discussions can be found in [6] .
use an asymmetric mechanism which allows receivers to verify multicast messages authenticity without being able to generate valid authenticators for messages on behalf of the sender. Some solutions: Desmedt et al. [11] , Safavi and Wang [44, 45] , Fujii et al. [15] , Obana and Kurosawa [21, 43] , Canetti et al. [5] and [3] propose to introduce asymmetry in the key material used to authenticate messages. In other words, the sender knows the entire key material required to authenticate messages, and receivers know only a partial view of the key material that allows them to verify received messages' authenticity without being able to generate valid authenticators. This kind of solutions is subject to collusions, where a set of fraudulent receivers collaborate to reconstruct a part of the whole key material used by the sender, in order to forge authentic messages on its behalf. Other solutions: Bergadano et al. [1, 2] , TESLA [33, 35, 36] , BiBa [34] , Powerballs [26] and Better than BiBa [39] suggest to use time as source of asymmetry. In other words, receivers are synchronized with the sender's clock and are instructed when to accept a specific key as being used to authenticate received messages. In this case, a fraudulent cannot use a received (or eavesdropped) sender's key to forge messages on behalf of the sender. Indeed, by the time a fraudulent uses a sender's key to forge an authenticator for a message, receivers will reject the fraudulent's message because the used key would have been expired. This approach raises new security attacks relating to time synchronization disturbance.
Non-repudiation of malticast data origin
This security level guarantees non-repudiation in addition to data origin authentication. In this case, the multicast stream should be signed. Current digital signature mechanisms are very computationally expensive. Therefore, it is not practical to sign each packet of the multicast stream. Proposed solutions rely on the concept of amortizing a single digital signature over multiple packets. There exist three main approaches to achieve this amortization. Some protocols: simple off-line chaining [16, 17] , EMSS [33] , prandom graphs [25] , A 2 Cast [7] , periodic chaining [18] and piggybacking [25] amortize a single signature over many packets by chaining these packets using some hash-chaining techniques. Hash-chaining consists in making each packet carrying hashes that allow the verification of few packets. In turn, these few packets will carry the authentication information of some other packets, and so on .. The overall hash-chaining process culminates into a special packet called signature packet which is signed. This signature will then propagate throughout the hash-chain to assure non-repudiation of the chained packets. A second approach: tree chaining [47, 48] , Pannetrat et al. [28, 29] , SAIDA [30, 31] and Lysyanskaya et al. [24] consists in signing only a small piece of authentication information (namely hashes of block packets). The resulting authentication information (the signature as well as the original authentication information) is processed and dispersed among the block packets to be signed. The processing is made in a way that even if some packets (that does not exceed a certain threshold) are lost, the received packets can recover the whole authentication information which is required to verify received packets. This approach has the drawback to require high computation power to assure the processing in both generating and verifying the authentication information. Finally, in another approach: off-line/on-line signing [13, 14] , off-line/on-line k-signing [42] , instead of signing data itself, the source generates a sequence of (private/public) pairs of keys. Then it signs the public keys which will be, in turn, used to sign data packets using some fast signing scheme called: one-time signing. One-time signing is known to be very fast with the price that the pair of (private/public) keys can be used to sign only few packets. The essence of this approach is that the slowest phase (signing keys) is made off-line in a way that it does not interfere with the real-time transmission requirement of most of media-streaming applications. Then, each data packet is one-time signed using a beforehand generated and certified (private/public) key (in the off-line phase). The drawback of this approach is that the off-line phase is bounded to produce certified private/public keys at a rate which is lower bounded by the rate of data packets arrival at the source. The best solution to this inconvenient is to parallelize the solution and assure the off-line phase using a powerful server.
Related works
In this section, we will present some protocols that use signature amortization relying on hash-chaining techniques.
Simple off-line hash-chaining
The main idea of the solution proposed by Gennaro and Rohatgi in [16, 17] is to divide the stream into blocks and embed in the current block a hash of the following block (which in turn includes the hash of the following one and so on.) (see Fig. 2 ). This way, the signer needs to sign only the first block and then the properties of this single signature will propagate to the rest of the stream through the hashchaining. We note that in order to construct this chain, the sender needs to know the entire stream in advance (off-line). With this solution, the authentication information is reduced
to one hash per block and the sender signs only the hash of the first block. However, this solution is not fault tolerant: if a block is lost, the authentication chain is broken and hence all subsequent blocks can no longer be authenticated.
Random hash-chaining
Perrig et al. [33] proposed the Efficient Multi-chained Stream Signature protocol (EMSS). This protocol introduced the notion of redundant hash-chaining which means that each packet's hash of the stream is embedded in several subsequent packets. Then a final packet (which is called the signature packet) containing several hashes of previous packets is signed. Therefore, each packet has many hashchains to the signature packet. Thus, even if some packets are lost, a received packet is verifiable if it remains a hashchain that relates the packet to the signature packet. For a given packet, EMSS embeds its hash into k subsequent randomly chosen packets (k is called the redundancy degree). Hence, EMSS provides more or less probabilistic guarantees that it remains a hash-chain between the packet and a signature packet, given a certain rate of packet loss in the network. The robustness of the protocol to packet loss is proportional to the redundancy degree, k. In order for the sender to continuously assure the authentication of the stream, the sender sends periodic signature packets. To verify authenticity of received packets, a receiver buffers received packets and waits for their corresponding signature packet. The signature packet carries the hashes that allow the verification of few packets. These latter packets carry, in turn, the hashes that allow to verify other packets, and so on until the authenticity of all received packets is verified.
Challal et al. [7] proposed the A 2 Cast protocol. A 2 Cast uses a technique similar to EMSS, but the authentication information redundancy degree is source driven rather than fixed a priori. Indeed, with A 2 Cast, receivers communicate periodically to the sender the quality of reception reports (such as RTCP Receiver Reports [46] ). These reports contain the actual packet loss ratio faced by receivers in their respective sub-networks. Then the sender uses these reports to calculate the average packet loss ratio which is used in turn to determine the required redundancy degree in order to achieve high verification ratio. Fig. 3 shows the different messages exchanged between a sender and a receiver. It illustrates also the periodic operations executed by the sender and the receiver to adapt the redundancy degree and to verify the authenticity of received packets, respectively.
Simulations showed that this technique allows to save authentication information bandwidth overhead.
Minner and Staddon [25] proposed a redundant and random hash-chaining scheme to tolerate packet loss in a network where each packet is lost independently at random with probability q. Authors were interested in applications in which the sender has a priori knowledge of the content. Therefore, the hash-link topology is constructed before the first packet of the stream is sent. The random redundant topology proposed by the authors is called p-random graph. In a basic p-random graph scheme, packets of the stream are numbered from 1 to n. P 1 is the signature packet, and for all pairs of packets (P i , P j ) where j!i, the hash of packet P i is embedded within packet P j with probability p. Once the prandom graph of the stream is constructed, the packets of the stream are sent, respectively. A receiver starts by receiving the signature packet. If it is valid, the receiver verifies subsequent packets on the fly by checking the existence of a hash-link path between the received packet and the signature packet.
Deterministic hash-chaining
Modadugu and Golle [18] have proposed to use a similar strategy to EMSS, but packets that will carry the hash of a given packet are chosen in a deterministic way rather than randomly. The authors proposed deterministic topologies of packet hash-chains, called Augmented Chains. Augmented chains are designed to be optimized to resist a burst loss. The goal of the proposed schemes is to maximize the size of the longest single burst of loss that the authentication scheme can withstand (Once few packets have been received after a burst, the scheme recovers and is ready to maintain authentication even if further loss occurs).
Miner and Staddon [25] , proposed a similar authentication scheme, based on hash chaining techniques, specifically designed to resist multiple bursts. The proposed scheme, called Piggybacking, deals with the case where data carried by different packets has more or less importance from the point of view of the application level. Thus, packets are organized into classes with different priorities. Then hash chaining is made in a way that: the higher is the priority of a class, the more redundant is hash-chaining of packets belonging to that class, in order to resist better against bursty losses.
In what follows, we present our protocol which uses the concept of amortizing a single digital signature over 
multiple packets using hash-chaining, then we present simulation results that evaluate and compare the performance of RLH to other protocols.
RLH:
Receiver driven layered hash-chaining for multicast data origin authentication
Terminology
We define some terminology to simplify the following discussion: if a packet P j contains the hash of a packet P i , we say that a hash-link connects P i to P j , and we call P j , a target packet of P i . A signature packet is a sequence of packet hashes which is signed using a conventional digital signature scheme. A hash-link relates a packet P k to a signature packet S l , if S l contains the hash of P k . We designate by redundancy degree, the number of times that a packet hash is embedded in subsequent packets to create redundancy in chaining the packet to a signature packet. A packet P i is verifiable, if it remains a path (following the hash-links) from P i to a signature packet S j (even if some packets are lost). We designate by verification ratio: the number of verifiable packets by the number of received packets. The verification ratio is a good indicator of the verification probability which means the probability for a packet to be verifiable given that it is received: P (packet is verifiablejpacket is received). This probability is equal to the probability that it remains a hash-link path (a hashchain) that relates the packet to a signature packet after removing the lost packets.
Overview and motivation
To achieve non-repudiation, we rely on a conventional signature scheme for example RSA [41] . Unfortunately, the computation and communication overhead of current signature schemes is too high to sign every packet individually. To reduce the overhead, one signature needs to be amortized over multiple packets. The amortization is achieved using hash-chaining, which consists in signing a single packet and amortizing this single signature over multiple packets by hash-linking the current packet to another packet in the stream. In Section 3.1 we discussed a basic chaining scheme. In our protocol, we use a redundant hash-chaining scheme to tolerate packet loss. The redundant hash-chaining that we propose is organized into different layers of redundancy. A basic layer carries the payload data packets in conjunction with a minimal hashchaining redundancy degree. This layer is vertically chained to facultative layers with different amounts of redundant hash-chains. Each layer is sent to a different multicast group and assures robustness to a certain amount of packet loss. Periodically, receivers calculate the actual packet loss ratio and use it to decide whether to join a corresponding extra-layer in order to improve the verification probability. Fig. 4 illustrates a scenario where the source produces three layers of authentication information. L0 is the compulsory basic layer that carries the payload data packets. L1 and L2 are authentication information layers that receivers can join to improve the verification probability. In this simple scenario, we consider that L2 is more redundant than L1, and hence L2 is joined only by those receivers that encounter a sever packet loss rate in their subnet.
Since the packet loss distribution over a large scale network is likely to be not uniform [49] , this receiver driven technique will allow to save bandwidth. Indeed, with this technique, each receiver receives only the required authentication information that allows him to face the actual packet loss ratio in its subnet. In the following paragraphs, we will describe our layered hash-chaining scheme. Then we present the Receiver driven Layered Hash-chaining for multicast data origin authentication protocol (RLH).
Layered Hash-chaining scheme
The basic idea of hash-chaining is that each packet carries the hash of the previous packet. A final packet (the signature packet) is signed and guarantees data origin authentication and non-repudiation of the chained packets [17] . In order to tolerate packet loss, we make redundant hash-chaining: instead of carrying a single hash of the previous packet, each packet carries the hashes of multiple packets, so that even if some packets are lost, there is a probability that it remains hash-link paths between received packets and the signature packet. If a hash-link path exists
between a received packet and the signature packet, then the authenticity of the received packet is verifiable [17, 33] . In our case, we have different layers of redundant hash-chains. The first layer is the basic data payload layer. It carries data packets chained using a redundant hash-chaining with a small redundancy degree. These packets are also chained to other facultative layers. Packets of these layers are initially empty. Then, they are hash-chained using different redundancy degrees and hence carry only hashes of packets from the same layer or from the basic layer. It turns out that each layer i is characterized by two redundancy degrees: † The vertical redundancy degree, v i : determines the number of times the hash of a packet from layer 0 is embedded into packets from layer i. † The horizontal redundancy degree, h i : determines the number of times the hash of a packet is embedded into subsequent packets from the same layer i. Fig. 5 illustrates an example of layered hash-chaining with three layers: the basic layer has horizontal and vertical degrees, respectively, equal to 2 and 0. Layer 1 has horizontal and vertical degrees, respectively, equal to 3 and 1, and layer 2 has horizontal and vertical degrees, respectively, equal to 4 and 1.
When a data packet is presented to be sent at the sender, it is hash-linked following two steps:
(a) Horizontal hash-chaining: in this step, the hash of the current data packet is embedded into h 0 subsequent target packets: one packet is the next one, and h 0 K1 target packets are chosen randomly. Similarly, authentication packets that are beyond the current packet in the other layers are also horizontally chained to h i subsequent target packets, where i is the layer number. One target packet is the next one and the other h i -1 target packets are chosen randomly. (b) Vertical hash-chaining: in this step, the hash of the current data packet is embedded within v i target packets (for each layer i): one packet is the packet that has the same sequence number in layer i and v i K1 target packets are chosen randomly.
RLH protocol
We consider a multicast source of a stream which consists in a sequence of data packets. The source constructs the different authentication layers according to the layered hash-chaining scheme described above. The source sends each layer i to a different multicast group g i . In order to assure continuous non-repudiation of the stream, the source embeds within the stream a signature packet periodically. As we can see in Fig. 5 , a signature packet contains: † The concatenation of the packet hashes from the different layers for which the signature packet is a target packet. † A digital signature over this hashes' concatenation.
Receivers of the stream join the group, g 0 , and start verifying the authenticity of received packets relying on the basic redundant hash-chaining of layer 0. Continuously, receivers report lost packets using time outs and sequence numbers of received packets. Periodically, each receiver uses the packet loss ratio, calculated during the last period of time, to decide whether to join another layer in addition to the basic layer in order to improve the verification probability. Indeed, each new layer brings new hash-chains in addition to hash-chains of layer 0, and hence increases the probability that a hash-chain remains between each data packet and a signature packet even if some packets are lost. Table 1 summarizes the parameters involved in RLH protocol. These parameters influence the computation and communication overhead, the delay until verification, and the robustness against packet loss.
The sender side algorithm
In what follows, we denote a packet with a sequence number i and belonging to layer k by P k i . A source of a stream applies the layered hash-chaining scheme described 
above for each packet P 0 i before it sends it. Packets of layer k are sent to the corresponding multicast group g k . After each f data packets, the source sends a signature packet. We suppose that signature packets are sent using a certain reliable mean, such as retransmission in case of loss using some reliable multicast protocol or by replication that minimizes the probability of loss. The algorithm at the source would then be as shown in Fig. 6 .
The receiver side algorithm
When a receiver receives a signature packet S l , it verifies the signature of S l and verifies the authenticity of all the packets that have a path to S l . Packets that are not authentic and those that do not maintain a chain to a signature packet S l are labeled by RLH, respectively, not authentic and not verifiable. The application level uses authentic packets, rejects not authentic packets and can decide to use not verifiable packets depending on the desired security level. After each t seconds, the receiver analyses the packet loss ratio and decides whether to join another layer to increase verification probability of received packets. This decision is made using a function that we call update_membership for which it gives the packet loss ratio as a parameter. The algorithm at the receiver side is shown in Fig. 7 , and the verification procedure is illustrated in Fig. 8 .
Simulations and performance evaluation
We carried out simulations using Network Simulator v2 (NS-2) [27] 2 to evaluate the performance of RLH and compare it with EMSS [33] and A 2 Cast [7] .
The bursty packet loss model
We used the two state Markov chain model [50] to extend NS-2 with a new queuing behavior to simulate a bursty packet loss pattern. Indeed, many studies show that packet loss is correlated, which means that the probability of loss is much higher if the previous packet is lost. Paxson shows in [32] that packet loss is correlated and that the length of losses exhibit infinite variance. Borella et al. found that the average length of loss bursts is about 7 packets [4] . Yanik et al. show that a k-state Markov chain can model Internet packet loss patterns [50] . For our simulation purposes, the two-state Markov chain model is sufficient, since it can correctly model simple patterns of bursty packet loss [50] . Fig. 9 shows the two-state Markov chain used in our simulations and whose transition probabilities can easily be determined using the average burst length and the packet loss ratio in the network.
Simulation parameters
In what follows, we consider a bursty packet loss pattern with bursts having an average length equal to 7. Then, we considered a stream of 10,000 packets with a signature packet every 500 packets (fZ500), and where a packet is hash-linked to packets within the scope of 250 packets (dZ 250). The value of f has been arbitrary chosen. In reality, the value of f should be chosen depending on the application level tolerance to latencies, the computation power of communicating parties and the available bandwidth. The general rule is: if the parameter f is long, then receivers will Fig. 6 . The algorithm at the source side. The horizontal and vertical redundancy degrees of layer i f Number of packets after which a signature packet is embedded within th stream d
The scope within which packets are chosen randomly to embed the hash of the current packet t The period of time after which receivers analyse packet loss ratio to decide whether to join a new authentication layer Fig. 7 . The algorithm at a receiver side. 2 The Network Simulator NS is a discrete event simulator targeted at networking research. Ns provides substantial support for simulation of TCP, routing, and multicast protocols over wired and wireless (local and satellite) networks.
experience important latencies before verification but will not have too much signatures to verify, and the reduced number of signatures will not consume a lot of bandwidth. Receivers analyse packet loss ratio and eventually update their membership to authentication layers every 20 seconds (tZ20 s).
Updating the membership to authentication layers
Recall that periodically, the receivers analyse the actual packet loss ratio in their subnets. Then use this ratio to join and/or leave authentication layers in order to increase the verification probability. This decision is made using the update_membership function. To develop this function, we simulated different combinations of different layers with different horizontal and vertical redundancy degrees. At last, we selected the combination of three layers whose verification ratios are illustrated in Fig. 10 . Table 2 illustrates the vertical and horizontal redundancy degrees of the selected combination layers.
We notice that for packet loss ratios that varies from 5 to 15%, the basic layer suffices to reach 99% of verification ratio. The basic layer in addition to layer 1 assure 99% of verification ratio while tolerating up to 35% of packet loss. Finally, the combination of the basic layer with layer 2 assures 99% of verification ratio while tolerating up to 45%. Thus, when a receiver calculates the encountered packet loss ratio in its subnet, it calls the update_membership function depicted in Fig. 11 . Without loss in generality, we suppose that the maximum packet loss ratio is 45%
Simulation results
The adaptive aspect of RLH has been introduced to cope with the variation of packet loss over time and space. Therefore, we will study the behavior of RLH, compared to EMSS and A 2 Cast, through three steps: first, we consider the variation of packet loss over time only, then over space only, and finally over both of them simultaneously.
Packet loss variation over time
We consider the distribution of packet loss over time shown in Fig. 12 . The packet loss ratio varies, over time, from 5 to 35%. We considered 99% as a target verification ratio, and we run simulations of EMSS, A 2 Cast and RLH to determine the required redundancy degree by each protocol in order to reach the target verification ratio. Fig. 13 illustrates the required redundancy degree by each protocol 
over time. Notice that the redundancy degrees of RLH and A 2 Cast are proportional to packet loss ratio (compare the shape of the graph representing the redundancy degrees of RLH and A 2 Cast in Fig. 13 with the shape of the graph representing the variation of packet loss over time in Fig. 12 ). This is due to the fact that RLH adapts the redundancy degree relying on a receiver driven strategy as explained in previous paragraphs. Similarly, A 2 Cast adapts the redundancy degree to the actual average packet loss ratio relying on a source driven strategy. In contrast, EMSS uses a fixed amount of authentication information. Consequently, A 2 Cast and RLH allow to save some bandwidth compared to EMSS. For instance, A 2 Cast saves up to 88 KBytes when considering the overall stream using SHA-1. This saving can be very important when considering large periods of time with high jitters of packet loss ratio. Even though RLH behaves better than EMSS, its benefits are more remarkable in more realistic settings where packet loss distribution varies also over space in addition to its variation over time.
Packet loss variation over space
In order to illustrate the behavior of RLH compared to EMSS and A 2 Cast, when considering a large scale network, where the packet loss ratio is likely to be not uniform [49] , we considered a network with three different areas. Fig. 14 illustrates this simplified scenario. Each area is characterized by its own packet loss ratio. Namely, the three areas have, respectively, 5, 25 and 45% packet loss ratios.
We want to reach a very high verification ratio (99%). With RLH, each receiver in each area joins the required hash-chain layers to reach 99% of verification ratio using the update_membership function. In contrast, with EMSS, receivers are not able to choose the best redundancy degree. Fig. 14 illustrates the required EMSS redundancy degree to reach 99% of verification ratio when we vary the packet loss ratio from 5 to 60%. Therefore, the multicast source has to choose the best redundancy degree so that receivers can verify the authenticity of received packets with a probability equal at least to 99%. Three strategies can be envisioned: † Considering the minimal packet loss ratio: in this technique, the source considers only the area that experiences the minimal packet loss ratio. In this case, the source uses the degree 2 which corresponds to the required degree to tolerate 5% of packet loss (see Fig. 15 ). This technique allows to save bandwidth but receivers in the other areas will not reach the 99% verification ratio. † Considering the maximal packet loss ratio: in this technique, the source considers only the area that 
experiences the maximal packet loss ratio. In this case, the source uses the degree 5 which corresponds to the required degree to tolerate 45% of packet loss (see Fig. 15 ). This technique assures that all receivers in the different areas reach the desired 99% verification ratio, but receivers in areas 1 and 2 will waste bandwidth to receive useless authentication information (extraredundancy). † Considering the average packet loss ratio: in this technique, the source considers average packet loss ratio. In this case, the source uses the degree 3 which corresponds to the required degree to tolerate 25% of packet loss which is the average packet loss of the three areas (see Fig. 15 ). With this technique, some receivers may not reach the desired verification ratio. Fig. 16 illustrates the verification ratio reached within each area using these three different strategies. Notice that none of them achieves the best trade-off between authentication information bandwidth overhead and verification ratio.
In the case of A 2 Cast, the source receives periodically quality of reception reports from receivers in the different areas. These reports carry the actual packet loss ratios in each area, respectively. Then, the source computes the average packet loss ratio and adjusts the redundancy degree accordingly. Unfortunately, because of relying on the average packet loss ratio, the protocol fails to reach the target verification ratio (99%) for all of those areas. We notice in Fig. 17 that even though A 2 Cast saves some bandwidth compared to EMSS and RLH, it failes to reach 99% of verification ratio in areas 2 and 3.
However, in the case of RLH, receivers in area 1 join only the basic layer which suffices to reach the target verification ratio. Receivers of area 2 join the basic layer in addition to layer 1, and receivers of area 3 join the basic layer in addition to layer 2. This way, RLH allows receivers of different areas to save useless bandwidth and to request the only required redundancy degree to face the packet loss that is encountered in their respective areas. Fig. 17 compares RLH to EMSS and A 2 Cast regarding the authentication information overhead which consists in the embedded hashes that are used to construct the redundant hash-chains. It illustrates also the verification ratios reached by each protocol within each area. To make this comparison, we calculated the number of hashes (the authentication information overhead) that pass through the on-tree multicast border routers of each area: R1, R2 and R3 (see Fig. 14) .
We notice in Fig. 17 , that with EMSS 3 and A 2 Cast the three areas receive exactly the same amount of authentication information, even if each area experiences a different amount of packet loss ratio. In contrast, with RLH, each area receives a different amount of authentication information (different layers) depending on the encountered packet loss Fig. 15 . The required redundancy degree to reach 99% of verification ratio. Fig. 16 . The verification ratio within the three areas when considering the three different strategies. Fig. 17 . The authentication information overhead in the different areas. 3 We considered the maximal packet loss ratio strategy so that all receivers reach the target verification ratio. Fig. 18 illustrates the repartition of the authentication information overhead per area due to each layer. As expected, receivers of area 1 receive only layer 0 packets. Receivers in area 2 receive layer 0 and layer 1 packets, and receivers in area 3 receive layer 0 and layer 2 packets. This is due to the fact that receivers in each area join only the required layers to reach the target verification ratio.
To further illustrate how RLH allows to save bandwidth, let us consider the second scenario depicted in Fig. 19 . The multicast source streams the three RLH layers: the basic data payload layer (layer L0), the medium redundant authentication layer (layer L1), and the highly redundant authentication layer (layer L2). The dashed lines determine the three areas with the different packet loss ratios.
We were interested in measuring the tree authentication information cost, which we define as follows: Definition 1. The tree authentication information cost is the number of hashes, sent over a multicast tree, by the size of the multicast tree. We mean by the size of a multicast tree the number of network links that constitute the multicast tree. Thus the tree authentication information cost measures the total authentication information bandwidth overhead.
In our simulation, we used the NS2 implementation of PIM-SM protocol, with RP as a Rendez-vous Point node (see Fig. 19 ). In this scenario we considered a 5,000 packet stream. As we can see in Fig. 20 , RLH induces the creation of three multicast groups that correspond to its three layers: L0, L1 and L2. The sizes of these multicast trees are, respectively, 12, 4 and 2. Fig. 20 illustrates the tree authentication information cost induced by RLH compared to the ones induced by EMSS and A 2 Cast. With RLH, to each layer corresponds a tree authentication information cost: L0 spans all the receivers in the three areas with a redundancy degree equal to 2 hashes per packet. L1 spans only receivers of area 2 with a redundancy degree equal to 4 hashes per packet, and finally L2 spans only receivers of area 3 with a redundancy degree equal to 6 hashes per packet. The three layers induce tree authentication information costs, respectively, equal to: 104,500, 65,000 and 46,500 hashes in average. In contrast, with EMSS, there is a single tree that spans all the receivers in the three areas with a redundancy degree equal to 5, and hence induces a tree authentication information cost equal to 261,250 hashes, in average. Similarly, A 2 Cast generates a single tree that spans the three areas with a redundancy degree equal to 2 hashes per packet, inducing a tree authentication information cost equal to 155,289 hashes. However, since A 2 Cast relies on the average packet loss ratio, it fails to reach the 99% verification ratio in the different areas. Namely, it reaches only 32 and 86% of verification ratios in areas 3 and 2, respectively. 
According to the results depicted in Fig. 20 , we notice that the overall RLH tree authentication information cost (sum of the three layer costs) is roughly 50,000 hashes less than the cost induced by EMSS. If we consider a 160 bit hash function (such as SHA-1), RLH would then save up to 1 MBytes of tree authentication information. This is due to the fact that with EMSS, the source considers the maximum redundancy degree so that all receivers reach the same target verification ratio. Whereas, with RLH, receivers join only the required authentication layers to reach the target verification ratio. Therefore, RLH allows receivers to adapt the redundancy degree depending on the actual encountered packet loss ratio, and hence allows to save bandwidth while maintaining high verification probability. In contrast, A 2 Cast saves bandwidth but fails to reach high verification probability in the case where packet loss distribution is not uniform over space. This can be easily understood by the fact that the source relies on the average packet loss ratio to adjust the redundancy degree and hence receivers that face an actual packet loss ratio beneath the average will fail to reach high verification probabilities.
Packet loss variation over time and space
In this last scenario, we study the impact of packet loss variation over both time and space on the performance of RLH, A 2 Cast and EMSS. We consider a network with three areas where each area is characterized by its packet loss pattern as depicted in Fig. 21 .
The repartition of group members is also not uniform through the three areas. Namely, there are 20 receivers in area 1, 2 receivers in area 2 and a single receiver in area 3. With these settings, Fig. 22 shows the induced redundancy degree by each protocol for each area. EMSS requires a 4 redundancy degree to reach 99% of verification ratio. With EMSS, the same amount of redundant authentication information reaches the different areas during the whole considered period of time. In contrast, A 2 Cast adapts the redundancy degree according to the average packet loss ratio calculated at the source. However, this strategy failes to reach the target verification ratio at the overall areas. Indeed, with A 2 Cast, receivers at area 2 and 3 reach only 98 and 95% of verification ratio, respectively. Finally, we notice that RLH allows to adapt the authentication information redundancy depending on the actual packet loss ratio faced by receivers at different locations and at different moments. In fact, we see in Figs. 21 and 22 that for each area, caracterized by a specific packet loss pattern, corresponds an evolution of the authentication information redundancy that is proportional over time. Hence, RLH allows to reach the highest verification ratio (99% in this case) while minimizing the overall tree authentication cost.
RLH security and other performance criteria
RLH guarantees data origin authentication and nonrepudiation by relying on the existence of hash-chains between data packets and signature packets. Hence, the security of our protocol (RLH) relies on the security of this basic technique (hash-chains) which has been proved to be secure by Gennaro and Rohatgi [17] . We have shown in previous sections that RLH reduces the amount of tree authentication information while maintaining good performance in term of robustness against packet loss. Furthermore, we summarize some other features of RLH in what follows: † Storage requirement and delay before verification at receivers: with RLH, a receiver experiences a delay before verification of received packets, because it has to receive the signature packet which corresponds to received packets in order to launch the verification process. Hence, receivers need to buffer received packets until the reception of the corresponding signature packet. The duration of the delay and the size of the buffer 
depend on the period (f packets) after which signature packets are sent. † Storage requirements and delay before authentication at the source: with RLH, the source authenticates the packets and signs the stream on the fly. Hence the multicast source does not experience any delay before authenticating the stream packets. However, the source has to store packet hashes of the previous packets, from the different layers, until it processes all the packets that are supposed to carry a copy of those hashes. Because of using different authentication layers, RLH source storage requirement is higher than the storage requirements of EMSS and A 2 Cast. Fig. 23 illustrates the buffer size evolution for the three protocols, when considering packet loss variation over time only as depicted in Fig. 12 .
In average RLH, EMSS and A 2 Cast require to buffer 483, 196 and 185 hashes, respectively. Given effective hash sizes (128 bits for MD5, 160 bits for SHA-1), RLH sender would have to be able to store 10 KBytes of hashes in average. Obviously, this would not be an issue with current memory sizes. † Processing overhead at the sender: if we consider a general case of RLH with L layers, the sender would have to calculate L hashes per data packet (one hash per layer), in addition to a digital signature computation after each f consecutive packets. Wei Dai showed in his benchmark [9] that the speed of a MD5 [40] hash calculation is 204.55 Mbps using a Pentium IV, 2.1 Ghz processor. The same processor takes 4.65 ms to calculate a RSA-1024 [41] digital signature. EMSS and A 2 Cast induce less computation overhead at the sender, since both of them require only a single hash computation per packet in addition to a single digital signature after each segment of f packets. † Scalability: since the hash-chaining technique used by RLH is independent of the number of receivers, the protocol scales to large groups.
In conclusion, RLH efficiency increases when the multicast tree size is important and the packet loss phenomenon is concentrated in dense areas. A 2 Cast behaves better than RLH when packet loss distribution is roughly uniform over space. Both EMSS and A 2 Cast induce less storage and computation overheads at the sender, compared to RLH.
Comparison
The efficiency of a data origin authentication protocol with non-repudiation can be measured according to many criteria. Table 3 compares some data origin authentication with non-repudiation protocols, described in Section 3, with respect to the following criteria: 4 1. The latency at the sender: corresponds to the fact that the sender needs to buffer packets before sending them. 2. The latency at a receiver: corresponds to the fact that a receiver needs to buffer packets before verifying their authenticity. 3. Tolerance to packet loss: corresponds to the fact that the authentication process is possible even if some packets are lost. 4. Authentication information size: the size of the authentication information embedded to a packet.
Conclusion
Data origin authentication is an important component in the whole multicast security architecture. Besides, many applications need non-repudiation of data-streaming origin. To achieve non-repudiation, we proposed a new efficient protocol called RLH. Our protocol uses a layered hashchaining technique to amortize a single digital signature over many packets. This RLH's hash-chaining technique allows receivers to limit the authentication information bandwidth overhead to only the requiredoverhead that allows to reach a given packet verification ratio. Simulation results using NS-2 show that our protocol resists to bursty packet loss and assures with a high probability that a received packet be verifiable. Besides, the simulations and comparisons with two other protocols show that our layered hash-chaining technique allows to save bandwidth since the packet loss phenomenon is likely to be not uniform over a large scale network. The analysis of RLH compared to other protocols showed also that RLH induces more important storage and computation overheads that can be tolerated given the capacities of current processors and memories. 
